



PARTNERSHIP IN LEADERSHIP: A NEW BEGINNING

New Impulses for Transatlantic Relations

Report of the Task Force on the Future of Transatlantic Relations
Assembled by the Henry Kissinger Chair for Security and Strategic Studies
University of Bonn

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Preface

When Joe Biden is inaugurated as the 46th President of the United States, America will look to realign its leadership role in the world, offering Europe and the United States the opportunity to open a new chapter in transatlantic relations. For Germany and North Rhine-Westphalia – Germany’s biggest state -, this is a chance to contribute new ideas, adapting their political strategies to changing realities. This provides an opportunity to review existing instruments of political and economic governance, designating new policy priorities.

The global order is currently changing dramatically. Simply “carrying on as before” would lead transatlantic relations into a political and economic dead end. With this in mind, the Henry Kissinger Chair of the University of Bonn invited researchers and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic to collaborate on the issues at stake. Since the summer of 2020, the Task Force thus assembled defined future framework conditions, identifying the resulting political scope for shaping transatlantic relations which would result from them. The group’s starting point was the belief that the current geopolitical shifts

and the anticipated priorities of the incoming U.S. administration would require America’s European allies to embark on a new course of action.

A key element of the group’s work was to define North Rhine-Westphalia’s contribution and role in the transatlantic partnership of the future. In particular, the group identified the strengthening of the attractiveness and competitiveness of North Rhine-Westphalia as an economic region as central to the future of transatlantic relations. In a rapidly changing world, opportunities for investment, competition issues, priorities, and economic policy strategies depend to an even greater extent than before on trends that must be considered in the context of geopolitical developments. In its final recommendations, the report produced by the Task Force outlines the global political framework for the future of the transatlantic relationship. Further, it makes recommendations that address the current and future key issues in the transatlantic relationship between Germany and the United States.



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Executive Summary

The expectation that President Biden will resume America's old leadership role should be coupled with an expectation that his administration will redefine its transatlantic relations. Whether the United States remains the "European power" it has been since 1945 will depend not least on how the European Union and its member states understand and assume their future responsibilities. The report of the Task Force on the Future of Transatlantic Relations examines the new scope under the Biden Administration for Germany and the State of North Rhine-Westphalia to shape transatlantic relations. It also provides proposals for the reshaping of existing political and economic instruments.

Questions of power rivalries are increasingly being played out beyond traditional intergovernmental

patterns. China's rise, in particular, has been a cause of global power re-distribution. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, too, will continue to change the world, reshaping politics and society permanently. For these reasons, the United States is more important than ever as a partner for the German economy. In future years, keeping this partnership alive, focused on the new challenges of our time, will be a priority.

In the geo-economic competition of today's world, all eyes are on technology and business models. That competition thus requires from the United States and Europe, above all, a greater coordination and synchronization of state and private sector activities. The development of new technology will thus play a prominent role on the transatlantic agenda of days to come.



Europe's ability to shape security, both regionally and globally, is dependent on the political will and military capacity of the members of the European Union and Europe's other NATO member states.

Future transatlantic cooperation will focus in particular on the following areas:

1. trade, investment, and supply chains;
2. innovation, technology, digitization, and civil society;
3. sustainability, energy, and climate; and
4. defense and space.

Good and resilient transatlantic relations have been the foundation on which German foreign and security policy stands for decades. They will continue to be indispensable in the future.

Recommendations for the State of North Rhine-Westphalia include:


1. The creation of a digital infrastructure in line with the European Union's "digital sovereignty" ambition;
2. the promotion of disruptive research and innovation by a state agency;
3. the establishment of a "single point of contact" of the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia in the United States; and
4. the creation of theme-specific cooperation clusters (e.g. in the fields of vocational training and of Further Education).

Recommendations for the German Federal Government and for the Bundestag include:

1. Close transatlantic cooperation and coordination on achieving global standards on trade, technology, industry, health, safety, environmental issues, human rights and property rights, achieved particularly through joint action in international organizations;
2. A commitment to a Transatlantic Agreement on Free Trade, Innovation, Industrial Goods, and Investment between the European Union and the United States;
3. Coordinated transatlantic geo-economic and geo-strategic thinking and action, and the development of a joint early risk identification infrastructure;
4. The annual preparation of a "Strategic Risk and Prevention Report";
5. The joint promotion of hydrogen technology and infrastructure;
6. The development of joint data collection on climate research; and
7. The strengthening of the role of the Coordinator of Transatlantic Relations.

PART ONE

A WORLD IN TRANSITION: AMERICA AND EUROPE ON THE MOVE



Under President Joe Biden, America's primary focus will lie on Asia, Latin America, and Russia. However, unlike during the "pivot to Asia" of the first decade of our century, the United States' turn to Asia under the Biden Administration will offer a number of opportunities for Europe, as long as both sides manage to come to the realization that transatlantic cooperation is of mutual benefit. Regardless of whether China is perceived in the coming years as a strategic competitor or as an adversary in a potential new Cold War, the United States will depend on close partners more than in the days when the dream of a symbiotic American-Chinese relationship was still alive.

In the strategic competition of the future, the primary concern on both sides of the Atlantic will lie on how to facilitate a life in freedom, security, prosperity, and sustainability. In this global contest, North America and Europe will only be able to survive if they stand shoulder by shoulder. This emerging contest will be expressed—especially within international organizations—in the struggle for trade, technology, industry, health, safety, security, environmental and human rights standards or for property rights. The most serious consequence of this competition is a geo-economic reorganization of the world, in which the maps of power and influence will likely be redrawn. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush offered the Federal Republic of Germany a "partnership in leadership."¹ Joe Biden's presidency will provide for Germany, as a European power, the tremendous opportunity finally to realize the promise America made three decades ago. A partnership in leadership, however, is dependent on Germany's willingness to accept new European and geopolitical responsibilities and to do so side by side with the United States. It is thus important that Germany not succumb to the temptations of a worshipping of undefined multilateralism, but to combine continued support for a multilateral order with a conscious geopolitical positioning.

THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER

World orders are never static, but are subject to constant change and occasional collapse. Power rivalries, the struggle for influence, and economic competition can be discharged in military conflicts in extreme cases. Strategy, based on the unity of diplomacy and military might, while taking economic interdependencies into account, has always been aimed at avoiding the escalation of conflicts: the goal is a balancing of interests and a stable international order. "The world America made"² (Robert Kagan) has become a confusing, multipolar world. The "unipolar moment" of the United States³ of 1990 (Charles Krauthammer) has already faded away. The last thirty years have proven that the United States' position of world supremacy has not managed to facilitate the realization of the Wilsonian dream of an order of peace based on the principle of collective security. At the same time, however, the world is to a very significant degree shaped by American ideas of order and US diplomacy. However, America's supremacy has animated opposing forces in recent decades.

In the four years under President Donald J. Trump, the United States revoked a number of international treaties and agreements and withdrew from several international organizations. The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan speaks to a certain overextension for which the United States has paid a political price domestically. This non-polar world can no longer be adequately described through traditional patterns of balance and hegemony. The multilateral institutional structure has been weakened. It often no longer corresponds to the global political and economic realities of our time. This makes attempts at creating order increasingly difficult. The continuing crisis of the United Nations – and, in particular, the ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council as the primary forum for maintaining world peace and international security – reflects this. Efforts further to develop international law have also come to a standstill.

For centuries, the “great powers” were the determining factor in international affairs. The “Spring of Nations”⁴ of 1989 (Michael Howard) reconfirmed the supremacy of the principle of national self-determination. However, the increased tendency since then to relinquish sovereignty and the associated restrictions coming with it have repeatedly come into conflict with the principle of the nation-state. They have led to misunderstandings and misjudgments. Today the fear of postmodern “tribalism” and secessionist forces is greater than ever for many powers.

The category of “great powers” continues to exist, however. The goal of becoming a great power—as epitomized by China, Russia, and increasingly India as well—remains the leitmotif. The classification of which states fall into this category today has shifted, however. Furthermore, two major changes of the last decades are making themselves felt here: the relative decline of the territorial principle of power and the associated surrender of sovereignty that comes with it, as well as the increasing statutory regulation and supra-nationalization of the international order with the associated coexistence of classic nation states and supranational units. Simultaneously, the international system is increasingly shaped by the growing importance of non-state players, be they violent actors or globally operating companies.

Questions of power rivalry have grown in importance in recent years. Today, rivalries are increasingly being fought beyond classic interstate patterns. The United States and China are competing for supremacy in Asia. A largely unregulated competition – predominantly between the United States, China, and Russia – has by now also moved to the realm of the cyberworld. It is, first and foremost, fought out over network architecture, data and information sovereignty, Artificial Intelligence,

edge technology,⁵ and global supply chains. The main rivals for the United States and Europe remain China, a para-market economy under communist supervision, and Russia. Russia as the successor state to the Soviet Union and as an Asian flank power has been the geopolitical loser of the collapse of the Yalta and Potsdam order. The possibility of a further relapse into authoritarianism in Russia and its associated security threats to its European and Asian neighbors remains a potential risk to the international system, and thus an unresolved strategic task—especially for Europe.

China’s rise has been one of the causes of the global redistribution of power as well as one of the driving forces behind the increase in frequency of confrontations. China has gradually been expanding its global influence. For example, China has been supporting Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear arms build-up technologically. It links its strategic interests to its economic presence in Africa, Central Asia, and increasingly in Latin America. For years, China has been pursuing the opening of Central Asia by building transport infrastructure between East and West, with Iran and Pakistan as points of transit to the Indian Ocean, with the overriding goal of building an infrastructural connection between the Gulf region, the Caspian region, China, and the Indian subcontinent. China competes directly with the United States and Europe in the area of new technologies and sees itself as a rival of the US and its partners in various regions in terms of economic policy and military strategy.⁶ At the same time, China undermines the Western practice of offering conditional international aid. Further, it diminishes the influence of German and European development policy by investing in infrastructure or raw materials extraction regardless of good governance, social, or ecological standards.

The center of gravity of the world economy has shifted further eastward in recent years. Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the emerging nations of Asia were the economies with the highest growth rates. The dynamic growth of the Chinese economy and the strengthening of Chinese entrepreneurs is increasingly being perceived as a competitive challenge in the United States and Europe. That growth also has consequences for North Rhine-Westphalia, with its sustained interest in growing and deepening economic and trade relations with East Asia. North Rhine-Westphalia is also geopolitically impacted by China's ambitions, as the Chinese Silk Road ends at the Port of Duisburg.

The role of regional organizations continues to grow across the world. The ten ASEAN states recently concluded the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership⁷ with Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. The partnership will create the world's largest economic zone, governing trade amongst almost a third of the world's population. This will allow new value chains to develop, especially in high-tech sectors such as electronics or the semiconductor industry, and new innovation systems will emerge at the expense of the United States and Europe. In ten years' time, the share of the 15 RCEP member countries in global economic activity may rise to 50 percent.



The Port of Duisburg forms the end of the New Silk Road.

DRIVERS OF STRATEGIC CHANGE

The current anarchic-revolutionary incarnation of international order continues to thrive. Today we are witnessing a proliferation of state and non-state violence. It has been confirmed once more that the dynamics of international relations are driven by technological, economic, social, or, for that matter, international law developments. Transnational challenges can generate symmetrical effects globally affecting all states equally, particularly as they pertain to climate change, pandemics, resource scarcity, and mass migration.

Strategic developments are a function of the results and after-effects of earlier change. In their combination of state oppression, civil war conditions, and terrorist violence, the conflicts of recent years are indicative of a transformation of international affairs. They confirm the need for a rule-based order characterized by liberal-democratic values and the strengthening of the international organizations which support it, such as the United Nations, as well as an increase in the efficiency of their dispute settlement mechanisms and further advancement of international law.

For this reason, the states of North America and Europe must come together to renew the liberal-democratic order they created in the wake of World War II, together with partners from around the world and in opposition to new illiberal ideas of order.⁸

A large number of technological and digital developments favor the accelerating effect of uncertainty, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or the increase in globally active international terrorists. Government-sponsored hacker attacks cause lasting damage

to state actors and companies. Further, they destroy critical infrastructure. Globalized networking also enables some new actors to influence international relations in novel ways and to counteract the authority of official bodies to shape events and developments.

Supply routes between megacities—the infrastructural significance of highways, railroads, pipelines, shipping lanes, and Internet connections for supply routes and successful infrastructure development—determine power and strength today. With the worldwide phenomenon of devolution, the increase in the number of actors in international affairs and the resulting lack of transparency, they are becoming a global trend in connectivity. Political and economic power relations are being restructured. Exchange processes are becoming focal points in an increasingly intense geo-economic competition, which is intensified by technological developments, a catalyst for change and progress. Networks increase the vulnerabilities that result from dependence.

In addition, the United States, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, and other Asian, African, and Latin American countries have suffered major natural disasters in recent years. They have had global strategic effects and political consequences for international security, accelerating change in the process. The fires that raged in Australia for seven months in 2019, destroying an area of 75,000 square miles, resulted in the evacuation of tens of thousands of people. Between 2010 and 2019, climate catastrophes around the world have caused damage worth approximately 2.5 trillion U.S. dollars.⁹ Climate change further threatens water and food supplies, makes coastal landscapes uninhabitable, and is bound to cause further global refugee flows.

The need for a foreign policy focus on climate change has the potential to bring Europeans and North Americans closer together. Technological innovation, investments in sustainability, and the solution of problems caused by climate change should therefore be given political priority. The area of climate research and the development of climate-related data collection, as well as incentives for the rapid use of new technologies ready to be applied purposefully and efficiently, are directly related to this political prioritization. The return of the United States to

the Paris Agreement, as envisaged by President Biden, and the consistent pursuit of the strategic goal of climate neutrality by the year 2050 would constitute an important step in this direction. Against this background, the cooperation between Europeans and Americans in the ‘High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People’,¹⁰ which also includes a group of Latin American and Caribbean as well as a number of African and Asian countries, is of great strategic importance.



High voltage-lines transmitting energy in the Ruhr Valley

AMERICA AND EUROPE TODAY

The current tectonic shifts in world politics fundamentally affect the relationship between Europe and America. They create a new balance of power all the while the United States is forced to redefine its role in world politics. The problems associated with North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Libya, Sudan, and Western Africa threaten world peace and international security. As a result, they affect the United States and Europe together. They also pose challenges to the United States' political and military position in the regions concerned.

Over the past four years, the United States has repeatedly raised doubts about the reliability of its commitment to its allies and to a rule-based international order. At best, "America first" came with the implicit message to partners and allies: "allies second." Sometimes partners and allies were dismissively referred to as "so-called friends" and treated accordingly.

Under the leadership of President Biden, the United States will continue its old leadership role, but will redefine it.¹¹ For America, this raises the question of how it will deal with the erosion of its position as a world power, how it will react to China's growing economic and political weight, and what role it will play in terms of safeguarding international order and security. Another question arises as to how the United States will shape its global capacity to act in the future as a maritime, air, and technological power. The answers to these questions will be of particular relevance to the United States' relations with Asia, Russia, and Latin America.

Whether America remains the "European power"¹² it has been since 1945 will depend not least on how the European states and the European Union understand and assume their future responsibilities. The commitment to common responsibility unites Europeans and North Americans, particularly as the economic and moral strength of the Atlantic community is based on shared values. When new thinking is called for against the background of the current changes in world politics, this includes in particular a reflection on ourselves. This reflection takes place in the awareness that in the future, Europeans will be called upon to make a much stronger contribution to common security, and the EU will have to be clearer about its own role and more efficient in carrying out its global political tasks. Furthermore, a joint struggle for free trade, technology, industry, property, health, safety, environmental, and human rights standards will be possible only if Europe addresses its latent anti-Americanism, and if Europeans are willing to commit to a transatlantic "partnership in leadership."

During this time of crisis and global political upheaval, Europe appears weakened, with its capacity to act challenged more than ever. The intertwining of the financial, economic, and migration crises and the burdens of international order caused by terrorism and anarchic tendencies are mutually reinforcing. Europe's influence in the world today is insufficient.

There is a danger that the "pivot to Asia" will lead to a further loss of Europe's strategic importance, unless the states of Europe find their way to a "partnership in leadership" alongside the United States. The "pivot to Asia" was a logical consequence of the geopolitical shifts since the end of the Cold War, as well as of global—i.e. technological, infrastructural, and energy industry—developments and the associated shifts at the center of gravity of the last two decades. Europe's influence over oil and gas sources, for example, has been weakened by the growing energy independence of the United States,

achieved directly through moving away from Europe's oil and gas neighborhood in North Africa and the Middle East, and the expansion of the US domestic shale oil and gas industry. This has meant that European oil and gas interests are no longer a decisive factor in US foreign policy considerations. These developments should be incentive enough for Europe to regain its power to shape the future through cooperation and political initiatives.

In addition to political developments, questions of the future economic order are of essential importance to Europe. They will determine the prosperity and security of Europeans. The EU is a political community and, as the largest single market in the world, it depends on free trade. Due to its central location, its population structure, its excellent transport infrastructure, its dynamic development as a center for trade and services, and its dense

network of research and development institutions, North Rhine-Westphalia is excellently positioned to play a leading role in the European-American project which will bring together business and science, research and development, to shape transatlantic relations in a powerful way.

Important issues for a stable partnership between Europe and North America are thus also key topics that should be at the heart of the further economic development for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, its international positioning and its innovation strategy.




US-American companies in Germany per federal states in 2020 (in %)



© NRW.Global Business GmbH, Source: ORBIS Europe company database, June 15, 2020

Trading volume of North Rhine-Westphalia with selected countries 2019 (in Mill. EUR)



Source: IT.NRW, November 2020

PART TWO

SHAPING THE FUTURE TOGETHER: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES



The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will continue to change politics and society in the long term. We have experienced how vulnerable we are, including how dependent we have become on each other, and we must recognize the importance of strategic foresight in security prevention. We quickly require coherent, effective, and innovative solutions. In a complex and interdependent world, we will only be successful in a community of Western democracies if we work together and develop common strategies, in order to

- preserve the basis of life on our planet;
- maintain prosperity and security, and to bridge the gap between rich and poor;
- avoid the manifold dangers of confrontations between and within states.

TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND SUPPLY LINES

The major developments in world politics are setting the framework conditions of strategic competition and influence the dynamics of economic relations. Globalization has made a worldwide increase in prosperity possible. However, it has produced not only winners but also losers, especially in industrialized countries.

Support for globalization among the people of many industrialized countries has dwindled and globalization is slowing down. The advantages of openness and international cooperation are increasingly being questioned, impacting worldwide trade relations. The United States has been the source of trade conflicts especially with China, but also with other countries, that weigh on the world economy.

Trade relations between the EU and the United States, for example, are burdened by disputes over punitive tariffs and permissible subsidies and the linking of national security issues with import restrictions.¹³ This has an impact on economic relations between the United States and Germany. In the past four years, protectionist tendencies have cast a shadow over these relations. In 2019, the punitive tariffs imposed by the US on numerous goods from the EU are currently straining transatlantic relations. The United States is more important than ever as a partner for German business. However, in view of the increasing political rivalries and global developments, we must be prepared for difficult framework conditions.

In the coming years it will therefore be important to keep the transatlantic partnership active and competitive, while adapting it to the new challenges of our time. To the extent that the US and the EU are competing with China economically, and also for ideas of order in the global economy, the cultivation of the ties that are being forged across the Atlantic will become even more important for both sides. This is not a case of classic economic competition within recognized norms, but rather of a competition for a new orientation of the rules of the game in the global economy. Europe and North America are already privileged partners when it comes to direct foreign investment, and the share of American direct investment in Europe has been rising for years. Since 2015, the United States has been the most important


sales market for goods exports from Germany.¹⁴ North Rhine-Westphalia makes a decisive contribution to the transatlantic trade relationship within this sphere.

Prosperity and jobs in both countries therefore also depend on the shape of future transatlantic economic relations. The dismantling of industrial goods tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers would be an important step towards revitalizing transatlantic relations. Against this background, the conclusion of a free trade and investment agreement between the United States and the EU would be a milestone. A transatlantic agreement on industrial goods would have to comply with WTO requirements and liberalize nearly all trade. The massive resistance to the CETA economic agreement with Canada



Zeche Zollverein in Essen

North Rhine-Westphalia's share of German Foreign Trade with the USA 2019



© NRW.INVEST GmbH, Source: IT.NRW, March 2020
(optical adjustments made by the publisher, 30/11/2020)

in Germany and other EU countries shows that the task of persuading Europeans of the advantages of such further trade liberalization steps with the United States remains a challenge.

At the same time, increasing competition has had a decisive impact on the development of the global economy. The question of access to and control over raw materials, technologies, supply routes, and supply chains are of strategic importance today. This applies in particular to the areas of energy, health, foods, and digitalization. The competitive environment on both sides of the Atlantic has changed significantly due to geostrategic and geo-economic factors.

Geo-economic competition is competition for technology and business models. This requires a stronger coordination and synchronization of governmental and corporate

efforts in the field of technology development in order to present effectively a competitive challenge to international markets. Technology development will be high up on the future transatlantic agenda. This also applies to fields such as biotechnology.

Greater public-private coordination with regard to current and future technology developments would enable both sides to identify jointly and assess the opportunities and risks arising from the changed geo-economic environment. In many countries, technology transfer is now an indispensable prerequisite for market access. It offers opportunities to gain a foothold in new markets, but also carries with it the risk that this will enable the rise of future competitors. This is why public-private partnership is key to the following question: which technologies are passed on, to whom, under what conditions, as well as where red lines are to be drawn.

The flow of data, trade, and energy, in particular, runs the risk of political instrumentalization against the background of heightened geopolitical competition.

Increased competition on both sides of the Atlantic, which is set to intensify further, must therefore take geo-economic and geostrategic factors into account to a greater extent than ever before.

Rising uncertainties and security challenges are likely to lead to further disruptive events, whether as a result of another pandemic, a natural event, or stricter regulations for the export of critical raw materials or technologies. It is precisely the nature of global economic interdependence and the worldwide dissemination of technology and knowledge that enables non-state armed groups to resort to means that were once accessible to states only. In addition to technology development, geo-economic competition is increasingly focusing on the design of corporate supply chains and value-adding networks. This means that guidelines for the future design of supply chains can be used to determine competitive advantages and disadvantages for different groups of actors. This requires above all a new approach to data and the ability to address the increasing complexity of security policy concepts.

In the future, the attractiveness of a location will therefore depend to an unprecedented extent on the resilience of the national crisis.¹⁵ For companies, strategic reserves that guarantee the resilience of operational processes and supply chains will become a distinguishing feature in competition. The current crisis has heightened awareness of the role of the state in the overall structure. One of its tasks in the future will be to empower business and society more comprehensively to recognize risks early and take appropriate measures to mitigate harm.

Strategic crisis resilience means that the state must cushion risks to the economy and society with robust protective measures and emergency programs while taking active steps to enable businesses and society to recognize and counter risks earlier. This form of strategic crisis resilience places particular emphasis on developing the ability to anticipate crises in order to recognize the origins of potential strategic shocks and to take action at an early stage. This requires novel procedures that allow for improvisation and flexibility on the basis of new, untied reserves.

INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGY, DIGITIZATION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The fields of action in which Europe and America should shape a common future transatlantic agenda cover the entire spectrum of economic and social life. The common understanding must be that we will only be able to master the challenges together if we succeed in establishing a policy based on partnership, further deepening our relations and developing joint solutions for future challenges. We can fall back on tried and tested methods, but at the same time we must take innovative paths, develop new ideas, and prepare the future.

Bureaucracy and overregulation often prevent the implementation of obvious solutions. Administrations tend to preserve the status quo, exaggerate difficulties in implementation, and create administrative hurdles. In some cases, political decision-making processes hinder the search for compromises and the preference for the lowest common denominator; in other cases, political processes ensure that the really pressing issues do not reach the highest level. It will therefore be important to

facilitate a constant exchange between Americans, Europeans, and Germans at all levels and to promote collaboration in cross-national and cross-divisional teams.

A visibly strong and lasting transatlantic relationship is linked not least to a significant broadening and enduring revitalization of scientific cooperation between the United States and Germany, and thus especially with North Rhine-Westphalia.

In recent years, American universities and other research institutions have experienced a fall of engagement with Germany, and its history, economy, culture, and society. German expertise has been declining for some time among US decision-makers. However, the United States and Germany will only be able to be “partners in leadership” if they understand each other. We therefore recommend that German federal and state governments, charitable foundations, and private donors will collaborate in inspiring and co-funding the establishment of a new infrastructure of engagement with Germany in American universities and think tanks.



International Security Forum Bonn 2019




Current technological developments and the debate about Germany's role in the world offer the opportunity to add to the American image of Germany elements of innovation and a drive for reform. At the same time, this will provide current American science with points of contact for future-oriented projects.

Digitalization is about to catapult the international economy into a new age. While the digital sector was previously a single, albeit very successful, branch of industry, and the platform economy was limited to individual industries, the cross-cutting character of the impact of the digital sector is now becoming increasingly apparent. The virtual world is merging with the real world to form an indistinguishable unit. This is changing people's everyday lives, but even more so business models and behavioral processes in politics, business, and society.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and operative technologies (OT), such as industrial information technologies, create previously unimaginable possibilities for comprehensive automation in the cognitive and mixed mechanical-cognitive area. In industry, this means above all the development of cyber-physical systems—initially applied via smartphones, but in the future possibly also via sensors and actuators in and on the body—in the direct living environment and in public space. It also means a whole range of economic and social challenges that must be addressed by politics. “Action imperatives” exist, for example, in the fields of re- and up-skilling and – especially in the United States – also in the area of social security.

Global Digital Readiness Index 2019



Source: Cisco Global Digital Readiness Index 2019

Note: The Global Digital Readiness Index provides a holistic image of a country's digital maturity. It contains seven components such as investment, technological infrastructure, start-up environment, human capital and living standards. The scale ranges from 0 to 25 with Chad (4,32) coming in last and Singapore (20,26) leading the ranking.

The strategic effects of these technologies are still underestimated in Germany. They form the interface between the real and virtual world. At the same time, they enable the integration of the customer and significant parts of his or her behavior into automated business processes of all kinds. Technical features contribute to this, but the way in which people use corresponding services will be of even greater importance. Technologies that are already being used operationally have a strong effect – for example, robotics and drone technology or the use of additive manufacturing, which in many cases can lead to the relocation of the production site (closer) to the customer. This can mean, for example, that production is re-shored, albeit with rather limited job creation effects. For a large number of companies, this is connected with the possibility of a more effective organization by a new design of the business processes.

If Germany and North Rhine-Westphalia desire to become attractive partners for the United States in the field of digitization, then this is dependent on appropriate decision-making with a view to creating an attractive research and corporate landscape, ranging from tax law requirements to implementation in digital solutions.

In companies as well as in public administration, a further systematization of digitization would be linked to the requirement to develop and implement engineering procedures for all three dimensions of digital transformation, namely the service provision model, the service offering model, and the customer interaction model. If digital technologies can be used optimally in this way, a truly unique selling proposition could be developed within a short time, which would consist of establishing North Rhine-Westphalia as a model example of the successful amalgamation of an industrial economy with elements of a modern digital economy. The State of North Rhine-Westphalia would thus set international standards, would become capable of forging privileged partnerships with similar economic areas around the world, and would balance the “old” and the “new” economy in an attractive way.¹⁶

These processes will radically change the supply of traditional and new jobs and redefine the value of work. They will also lead to new challenges, in Germany as well as in Europe, for the political, economic, and social integration of those on the losing side of the international division of labor.

SUSTAINABILITY, ENERGY, AND CLIMATE

The prospective return of the United States to the Paris Agreement under President Biden and the announcement of the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050, while investing in renewable energies, opens up new areas of cooperation in transatlantic relations in the field of climate policy. This cooperation can also be seen as a new beginning and impetus in global climate policy. A rapprochement on the climate issue would also help to overcome the emotional alienation of many European societies from the United States and contribute to a greater sense of togetherness. This will succeed best if presented without moral lessons but rather as an offer of cooperation.

Climate policy cannot be conceived without taking energy policy into account. In this area, too, new

opportunities for cooperation are opening up. Europe and America will come together again in their common belief in sustainability. Energy policy is undergoing profound change: new technologies are bringing us closer to the goal of decarbonization. They are also creating attractive growth opportunities in the process. Green hydrogen technologies deserve special attention as a possible “game changer” in the transformation of our energy sector, our industries, our transport systems, and, last but not least, our agriculture.

In energy policy, America’s European partners will also have to position themselves vis-à-vis nuclear energy use which the Biden Administration is likely to revive. Even if Germany is parting from these technologies at home, there could be prospects for future cooperation with the United States for German industrial users, ranging from power plant technology to waste disposal.



Why is it worthwhile to develop the hydrogen economy together? Germany is still at the beginning of a development with considerable, untapped potential. This includes the focus on electrolysis without sufficiently exploring possible alternatives such as hydro- or pyrolysis. The situation is similar with regard to the possibilities of decentralized application of green hydrogen technologies, e.g. by means of biogas plants or sewage treatment plants. This could be of particular interest for AI models. Green hydrogen is a new energy carrier that still requires a lot of research and development effort, but has considerable potential. Here the enormous research capacities on both sides of the Atlantic could be used in a coordinated way. Above all, however, green hydrogen requires a scaling effect.

Europe and America could set common technological standards for green hydrogen.¹⁷ This would help to reduce entry costs for both companies and consumers. Market fragmentation and potential trade barriers could be prevented. This includes the transport and storage infrastructure. Last but not least, the security of supply routes will also be a challenge that we should face together with our partners.

Europe and America should establish a common hydrogen market to address future issues from the outset, which would allow a faster price reduction due to high demand. This would also accelerate the global marketing of green hydrogen. European-American collaboration would constitute a joint contribution to climate protection as well as to economic growth. Both sides are determined to stem the loss of industrial capacity and, if possible, to reverse it. Green hydrogen as a climate-friendly energy carrier creates important prerequisites for the success of this strategy. Whether in a steel, cement, chemical-based or an energy-intensive industry, green hydrogen has the potential for making an economy emission-free and competitive.

In shaping the hydrogen market, it is important not to repeat the mistakes of the gas market. Natural gas, and especially the natural gas infrastructure, has become a political instrument that is often used by authoritarian regimes. The hydrogen business is a matter for companies, but the regulatory framework must be created by state actors. It should be transparent and inclusive — this makes economic sense and is politically desirable. If green hydrogen is to make an important contribution to climate protection, it must be made available to all countries and regions. At the same time, we can also offer economically weaker regions a place in the global hydrogen economy. Africa, for example, would be a key region of investment interest as a fast-growing continent whose future stability is in our common interest; it would be an obvious candidate for such a partnership. Its solar energy potential predestines Africa to become an important participant in the hydrogen market.

There are also many opportunities for cooperation in the design of a financing model for the green hydrogen economy. The European financing model, shaped by its public institutions, has many advantages, but is less apt to promote innovation — here in particular we can benefit from the American experience without having to copy the US system. A transatlantic Green Hydrogen Fund should be open to public and private donors, and the European Investment Fund, among others and in which KfW is involved, would work together with private American investors. It should invest its funds through purely private sector venture capital specialized in renewable energy. The public sector would have a say in setting the targets and defining the legal framework. Investment decisions, provided they do not exceed this framework, would have to be made according to market economy criteria. The development of the mobile phone network with its complex infrastructure is an example which, for all its differences, could serve as a model for the green hydrogen sector.

In promoting necessarily disruptive research – keeping in mind that the decisive step from basic research into practice must be successful¹⁸ – North Rhine-Westphalia should take inspiration from the American practice and build a “regional DARPA.”¹⁹ Here, intensive cooperation with neighboring Belgium and the Netherlands, each of which has fast-growing, research-heavy digital sectors, would be advisable. Such a cluster could also form the basis for broader European projects that pursue ambitious goals to fully exploit the enormous potential of European research capacities.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

The future security environment remains challenging and will continue to be subject to dynamic change. In times of globalization, digitalization, and the internet, distances are becoming less important. The increase in security threats, the blurring of boundaries between state and private actors, transnational criminal networks, and ever new technological possibilities also require an innovative new approach to security policy.

Focus should lie on a consistent orientation toward current and future threats as well as a review and necessary adjustments of security policy instruments. The goal must be to broaden the national consensus on security policy and to awaken the willingness of Europeans to invest more in their own security.

The rapidly changing global environment means that it is no longer possible to distinguish clearly between external security and homeland security. Real security can only be achieved across departments. What is thus needed is a strategy for overall defense with special attention to the protection of critical infrastructure, effective prevention of cyberattacks and the misuse of social media.

Military and non-military threats must be understood much more clearly than in the past as a single entity; the existence of asymmetric threats must also be recognized. This includes in particular the ability and willingness to link developments in the energy industry and in telecommunications with the protection of critical infrastructure which would also encompass and consider issues of big data, artificial intelligence, automation, and quantum computing with security policy issues.


In an increasingly unpredictable and dangerous world, armed forces must be able to respond in a specialized, agile, mobile, and flexible manner to completely new and diverse threats. In addition to threats to territorial integrity, these include those posed in particular by terrorist threats from fanatical zealots and global networks.

Technological trends, especially in the areas of artificial intelligence, robotics and cyber, if implemented consistently expand the capability profile of armed forces and prepare them better for the conflicts of the future. Our security will continue to be based on protection and the ability to deter conventional and nuclear threats. In

addition, further precautions must be taken against threats from hybrid warfare.

The modernization and realignment of the armed forces to a changing security environment will therefore continue to be at the center of government tasks on both sides of the Atlantic in the coming years. The EU is called upon to coordinate better expenditure on armed forces in its member states, to develop and use capabilities jointly and thus to assume a larger role in common defense. This would also guarantee for the North Atlantic Alliance to remain intact and strong. NATO will continue to be the common framework for our security, linking Europe and North America.

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union



(c) NATO HQ, Geospatial Section, optical adjustments made by the publisher, 30/11/2020).

NATO will remain the primary forum for consultation and decision-making among allies, as the alliance remains the foundation of collective defense. No other organization can perform this core task in the foreseeable future. However, NATO can only fulfil its mission as described in the Washington Treaty if the United States continues to commit fully itself to the obligations described therein, in particular those of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. With regard to complex military operations required for crisis management, NATO has unique political and military capabilities at its disposal, primarily due to the strategic capabilities and contributions of the United States.

Europe, however, must fundamentally clarify its relationship to the set-up, availability, and scale of its strategic forces and resources. Europe's ability to shape security policy depends on the political will and military capabilities of the EU member states and the United Kingdom, particularly in reference to the capability profile, the availability of the instruments based on the international commitments entered into by the member states, and how these are reflected in the EU's will to use available capabilities.

In contrast to NATO, the EU has a much broader spectrum of civil and military instruments and capabilities at its disposal. It can draw on a steadily growing body of experience, particularly in long-term stabilization, reconstruction assistance, and humanitarian missions. This includes the ability to plan and conduct CSDP operations autonomously. The EU could thus be in a position to assume the role of a guardian of law and order, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, in order to relieve the United States in these regions and to stabilize the transatlantic alliance as a whole, through a more appropriate distribution of roles and burdens.

Future crisis and mission scenarios require a broad and, as far as possible, joint civil and military capability profile. Against this background, a revival of the Comprehensive Approach,²⁰ the defense policy approach that attempts to combine political, civil, and military instruments, would be particularly promising. It will be a matter of further developing the European capability profile, increasing the availability of EU instruments, and mustering the will to deploy these capabilities. It is also a matter of making available a broad, effective, and sustainable range of EU and NATO capabilities from a "single set of forces." This expressly includes the joint development of capabilities of both organizations in the field of high technology.

An improvement in the EU's military capabilities, but above all the ability to think about European security in a joint strategic approach with the North Atlantic Alliance, will also be decisive for the future development of NATO. From a strategic point of view, Europe's first priority is to redefine its relationship with Russia. For Europe, this is an urgent challenge. It is also one that has led individual NATO members to come to differing assessments based on their respective historical experiences. In addition to Russia, the Mediterranean region and West Africa form a priority field of action in European foreign and security policy because of the American shift of emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region. The unstable situation in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, disintegrating states in Central Africa, and migration flows require comprehensive strategies.


In defining NATO’s future strategic significance, a joint response to geopolitical questions that go beyond the scope of the Washington Treaty will also play a decisive role. In particular, this will involve the issues associated with the turbulence in the Middle East, the rise of China, and the developments in Asia. The collapse of the 1987 Treaty on Medium-Range Nuclear Systems (INF Treaty), which expired on August 2, 2019, is a prime example of the need to formulate new strategic approaches in the light of global power shifts. While the INF Treaty was once the core of a *modus vivendi* between the US and USSR as superpowers that stabilized the entire world, it is not suitable for the fluid, multipolar world of the 21st century, since it excludes key actors on the world stage, especially China. However, the transatlantic alliance should make efforts to reform such existing regulations and adapt them to the current global political situation, rather than dispose of them in their entirety, thereby

strengthening anarchic elements in such important areas as arms control.

A joint analysis and joint conclusions—especially with regard to tasks—and burden-sharing are therefore indispensable to achieve the necessary unity between Europeans and North Americans, as the next chapter in the relationship between Europe and North America in the North Atlantic Alliance will have to bear an even more visible European signature.

The structural factors in favor of a reorientation of US foreign policy, in particular the striving for energy independence, the growing economic importance of East Asia, and the decline in the proportion of American citizens who feel a natural affinity to Europe because of their origin, will continue to have an effect. At the same time, the economic and political competition between

Defense expenditure as a share of the NATO member states' GDP 2020



Source: NATO: Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2020), 21/10/2020, p. 3

the United States and China will continue, intensifying the shift of power from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region. The attempt to use the enormous economic potential of this region for the benefit of the US economy, while keeping China's growing power in check, will determine US policy.

In 2017, chancellor Angela Merkel demanded in Trudering that "we Europeans really must take fate into our own hands"²¹, thereby calling to build capacity to act more independently of America in places like the Balkans and Europe's immediate neighborhood, in the Mediterranean, in North Africa, and in the Middle East. This corresponds with Europe's vital interests and is at the core of the idea of "strategic sovereignty."²² Even in crisis situations, Europe will continue to be able to rely on the Americans' obligation to provide assistance under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. However, the strengthening of the EU's capability to act in security policy will be all the more successful if the EU's security partnership with the United Kingdom is deepened, illusory security policy projects such as achieving "strategic autonomy"²³ are rejected, and cooperation between the EU and NATO is strengthened. Europe has the choice either to play into the hands of isolationism in the US or to help suck out the air on which it breathes.

The further development of the transatlantic relationship will also depend to a large extent on Europe's preparedness, to compete with China politically and economically on the basis of a EU-China strategy as well as a common strategic understanding with the United States. This also means working to contain China's political and military ambitions without severing existing economic and trade ties. In particular, democratic countries that belong to NATO's partners "across the globe"²⁴ should be actively engaged to join such an approach. The regular participation of European naval units in US "Freedom of Navigation" operations in the South China Sea, for example, would contribute to greater visibility of European responsibility in the region.

A more active policy towards Asia, the greater assumption of responsibility in Europe's neighborhood, a division of labor in military capabilities, and joint procurement are essential for Europe's ability to act in the field of foreign and security policy and will make it possible to put the relationship between Europe and the United States on a new footing in the long term.


At the same time, common answers must be found to ethical and international law challenges associated with AI, autonomous systems, and asymmetric warfare.

For the future cooperation between Europe and America, questions of use and security in space will increasingly arise. Satellites already perform central military tasks today. They provide secure communication links and deliver reliable data for climate prediction and navigation. They help to build up a protective shield against land- and sea-based medium-range weapons, avert cyberattacks, and are an early warning system against surprise military strikes. The EU has also established

capabilities that will enable it to perform tasks in space, strengthen its role in the development of new technologies, and make it a space power. Several key European economic sectors are now dependent on satellite services that perform the EU's space-based tasks. Here, too, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, which is home to a wide range of leading space institutions, is offered the opportunity to carry out innovative space research.²⁵

Space, as it has been in the past, is now again the subject of military power rivalries. Russia and China in particular are in a position to challenge the American military presence in space. President Trump's decision to strengthen

the American military presence in space and the associated development of capabilities to defend against and deter missile attacks is a joint task between the United States and Europe for the future. It will require research activities and collaboration, the development of corresponding military capabilities, and joint training programs. It will also need to address questions of the further development of customary international law and ethics.



PART THREE

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PRIORITY SETTING



In the search for stability, balance, and sustainability, the partnership between North Americans and Europeans is a *conditio sine qua non*. Maintaining and deepening this partnership is the guiding principle of our policy. We share the values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. We work in the North Atlantic Alliance, the strongest and most successful alliance in history, for peace in the world. We are connected by links that have grown over centuries and by a common world view. We are open to partners around the world with compatible values. We have passed global political tests together and trust one another.

Fruitful and resilient transatlantic relations have been the foundation of German foreign and security policy for decades and will remain indispensable in the future. At present, however, they remain well below their potential. It is particularly important to rebuild the trust that has been lost. The long-term reorganization of transatlantic relations is therefore in Germany's vital interest as well

as that of North Rhine-Westphalia. At the same time, however, we should be mindful that the revival of transatlantic relations will not be the first priority of US foreign policy. Its realization is conditional on the mutual development of a common strategic vision by Europeans and Americans, choosing fields for further cooperation that correspond with this common strategic interest.

In all areas, the reorganization of the transatlantic relationship will be all the more successful if the EU fully achieves its goals in terms of competitiveness, efficiency, and capacity to act. In particular, this includes a strengthening of foreign and security policy, a reducing of trade barriers, and a mastering of key technologies. Political priorities include the negotiation of a new trade and investment agreement between the EU and the US, the dismantling of customs duties and non-tariff barriers to trade, and the reorganization of NATO by participating in developing a new strategic concept focused on the strengthening of the European share of military capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STATE OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA

We recommend

- to give high political priority to the upkeep and deepening of transatlantic relations given the industrial policy objectives and the particularly favorable transport structure of North Rhine-Westphalia;
- to continue to represent the interests of North Rhine-Westphalia consistently through European projects, initiatives, and instruments and, in particular, to take advantage of the opportunities offered by projects of common European interest, e.g. in the energy sector;
- to organize the representation of interests at the EU level according to these objectives;
- to refocus policies governing secondary and tertiary education and research on boosting engagement with the history and culture of the United States, thereby enabling schools, universities, and other educational institutions – and increasingly also companies, foundations, associations and trade unions – to contribute to a further increase in civil society’s understanding of America and the strategic importance of transatlantic relations;
- to initiate a megacity dialogue with international city partners based on the triangle nexus of energy supply, clean technology, and smart cities.

A new beginning in the strategic dialogue with the United States should identify future challenges and fields of action. A continuous exchange of personnel and appropriate formats of cooperation would help to achieve a sustained deepening of relations and build further trust. A qualitative boost in relations could be achieved on the basis of a joint problem analysis and a joint innovation agenda based on this analysis, which would sharpen



North Rhine-Westphalia's profile as a modern, digitally-integrated business location. The measures will be all the more effective if the federal government as well as the North Rhine-Westphalian state government will do the following: design strategically their future dialogue with the United States, and explore new collaborations with state governments.

A deepening of exchange and cross-thematic cooperation should enable the development of a common strategic culture. In selecting the agenda topics, the focus should lie on the solution of urgent problems of our time and an emphasis on developing future technologies. In particular, topics should be chosen that can be approached jointly with other partners; as digitization, climate protection, energy security, hydrogen technology, logistics, and security offer particular potential, and these topics should be the focus of attention.

It is therefore proposed to initiate the following operational adjustments:

1. The creation of a digital infrastructure in the sense of the "digital sovereignty" aimed at by the EU

The European project Gaia-X will play a central role. Gaia-X aims to provide Europe with independent and internationally leading computing capacities and to build a networked digital ecosystem in which non-European partners can also be integrated. Bonn-based Deutsche Telekom is closely associated with this project; thus the state of North Rhine-Westphalia has the opportunity to be directly involved in the development of true European digital sovereignty.

Additionally, the state must build up its own analysis, diagnosis, and anticipation capacities. A strategy of multilateral cooperation for the development of a robust code of norms and standards based on international law should be agreed upon. In this context, it is also proposed to establish a transatlantic digital council. This Digital Council could operate on the basis of a more coordinated, inter-ministerial exchange in the EU member states and in close cooperation with technology



companies. In the decentralized implementation of the European digital strategy, North Rhine-Westphalia – ideally in cooperation with its neighbors Belgium and the Netherlands— could offer itself as one of the core locations.

2. The promotion of disruptive research and innovation by a state agency

Following the example of the US Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), an agency is recommended to be set up to specifically to promote specifically disruptive research and innovation and thus give new impetus to international cooperation between institutions located in North Rhine-Westphalia and in the United States. Such an institution could then also become a core locus of cooperation with the United States or individual US states. The experiences of the Franco-German JEDI initiative would be used as a guide.

3. The establishment of a “single point of contact” of the North Rhine-Westphalian government in the United States

The state government should create a point of contact for investment and cooperation projects on site (e.g. in Chicago or Los Angeles) and provide an office to oversee cooperation projects. This office could also be used by the state government for the initiation of local contacts, for Bundesland marketing, and for strategic communication with US government agencies.

4. The creation of individual, topic-specific cooperation clusters (e.g. in the area of education and training).

Such clusters could assume a pioneering role and demonstrate how transatlantic cooperation can be established and expanded “on a small scale.” In concrete terms, they could, for example, build on the rapidly growing US interest in the dual education model and dual studies and, in particular, promote partnerships between American universities and community colleges and German (technical) universities. The state government should attempt to set up an apprentice training and continuing education program together with suitable actors within the future American administration, which would link German companies from North Rhine-Westphalia in particular with locations in the United States to promote transatlantic exchange. Consideration could also be given to setting up new forums to facilitate civil society dialogue on issues such as how to deal with structural racism, discrimination, and social inequality.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG

It is recommended that the 1989 proposal of President George H.W. Bush for a “partnership in leadership” be brought to life out of the conviction that the United States and Europe can only master the challenges of the coming decade of the 21st century if they work together.

In this spirit, the following points are recommended in particular:


1. Close cooperation and coordination on trade, technology, industrial, health, safety, environmental, human rights, and property rights issues, particularly through cooperation in international organizations.
2. Promoting the conclusion of a transatlantic free trade, innovation, industrial goods, and investment agreement between the EU and the United States (with the prospect of opening the agreement to the regions bordering the southern Atlantic in the medium term) and a commitment to reducing industrial goods tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers, and red tape.
3. Geo-economic and geostrategic coordination and the development of a common risk early warning infrastructure; the creation of a common China strategy; joint securing of supply routes, supply chains, raw materials, and technologies.
4. The annual preparation of a “Strategic Risk and Prevention Report.” This report should be prepared in close cooperation between transatlantic think tanks, the American Chamber of Commerce, and leading German business associations. In a comprehensive risk analysis, geostrategic and geo-economic perspectives should be combined and global and regional risks for prosperity, innovation, and security should be recorded regularly and evaluated. The report calls an interconnected understanding of developments in the energy industry and telecommunications, critical infrastructure issues, all linked with security policy issues.
5. Joint promotion of hydrogen technology and infrastructure; the development of a common technological standard for green hydrogen; the creation of a common hydrogen market; cooperation in the financing and promotion of innovation in the field of hydrogen; the creation of a green hydrogen fund and living laboratories as well as coordination and synchronization in the field of technology development, in particular biotechnology.
6. The establishment of a joint data collection on climate research.
7. The strengthening of the role of the Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation with a view to pooling and encouraging initiatives from government institutions, charitable foundations, corporate and professional associations, and private donors, including a rebuilding of infrastructure of engagement with Germany at universities and think tanks.

Endnotes

- 1 On May 31, 1989, then US President George H.W. Bush gave a keynote address on foreign policy at the Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, Germany, which featured the phrase “partners in leadership.” He stated: “And the historic genius of the German people has flourished in this age of peace, and your nation has become a leader in technology and the fourth largest economy on Earth. But more important, you have inspired the world by forcefully promoting the principles of human rights, democracy, and freedom. The United States and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends and allies, but today we share an added role: partners in leadership. Of course, leadership has a constant companion: responsibility. And our responsibility is to look ahead and grasp the promise of the future. I said recently that we’re at the end of one era and at the beginning of another. And I noted that in regard to the Soviet Union, our policy is to move beyond containment. For forty years, the seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe lay dormant, buried under the frozen tundra of the Cold War. And for forty years, the world has waited for the Cold War to end. And decade after decade, time after time, the flowering human spirit withered from the chill of conflict and oppression; and again, the world waited. But the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free.”
- 2 Cf. Robert Kagan, *The World America Made*, Vintage, 2013.
- 3 Cf. Charles Krauthammer, *The Unipolar Moment*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70 (1), 1990/91; see also Charles Krauthammer, *Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy For A Unipolar World*, AEI Press, 2004.
- 4 Cf. Michael Howard, *The Springtime of Nations*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69 (1), 1989/90.
- 5 Edge computing enables faster transmission of data by providing it at the edge of a given network. The technology is key to enabling the “Internet of Things” (IOT).
- 6 *The Elements of the China Challenge* (Washington, DC: Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, 2020)
- 7 The free trade agreement between China and 14 other Asia-Pacific countries was signed, following eight years of negotiations, on November 15, 2020 in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi. It is the largest free trade agreement in the world, encompassing approximately 2.2 billion people.
- 8 In a keynote speech on foreign policy in 2017, then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs (presently Deputy Prime Minister) Chrystia Freeland, referring to the transatlantic architects of the liberal world order, stated, “Our job today is to preserve their achievement, and to build on it; to use the multilateral structures they created as the foundation for global accords and institutions fit for the new realities of this century. They rose to their generation’s great challenge. And so can we.” https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html
- 9 Cf. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *2020 State of the Climate Report*, October 13, 2020; World Meteorological Organization, *United in Science 2020 Report*.
- 10 This informal group, which also includes highly developed and developing countries, was founded in 2014 to ensure the conclusion of the Paris Climate Convention and to continue to advocate for highly ambitious climate policy goals even after the signing of this agreement in 2015. The composition of the group is also intended to illustrate the successful cooperation between industrialized and developing countries.
- 11 Cf. Joseph R. Biden, *Why America Must Lead Again*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 99 (2), 2020.
- 12 Cf. Richard Holbrooke, *America, A European Power*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74 (2), 1995.
- 13 Cf. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) and the US Foreign Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301).
- 14 Cf. Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (ed.), *Facts about German foreign trade*, September 2020.
- 15 The following is based on Heiko Borchert and Johann Frank, “COVID-29: Strategic crisis resistance needs a new balance between state and economy,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 10, 2020, <https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/covid-19-strategische-krisenfestigkeit-braucht-ein-neues-gleichgewicht-von-staat-und-wirtschaft-ld.1555473>

- 16 There are a number of fields of application, including the thematic link between energy supply, clean tech and smart cities. Here, town twinning would be a good way to kickstart an international initiative that makes megacities pioneers in this thematic triangle. The fact that Deutsche Telekom and the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) are located in North Rhine-Westphalia means that the state can demonstrate special expertise in the field of cyber security. In addition, the “UN city” of Bonn has all the relevant institutions to make an international contribution to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals.
- 17 As the seat of many UN organizations, Bonn in particular is predestined to become a “normative hub” in this area.
- 18 The state government in Düsseldorf should set itself the goal of promoting so-called “real laboratories” that can contribute to the implementation of the North Rhine-Westphalia technology strategy. Real laboratories are test rooms for innovation and regulation and serve to gather experience with digital innovation under real conditions. They also transfer results from basic research into application-oriented products, thus opening up markets. Regulatory simplifications should accelerate this transition. Such an approach would interlink with the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy’s (BMWi) approach.
- 19 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is an agency of the US Department of Defense that conducts long-term research projects for the US military and space project.
- 20 Cf. the communiqué of the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, which states (point 11): “Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including those of non-governmental organizations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach. These proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilization and reconstruction. They relate to areas such as planning and conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors. We task the Council in Permanent Session to implement this Action Plan as a matter of priority and to keep it under continual review, taking into account all relevant developments as well as lessons learned.”
- 21 Chancellor Merkel gave a speech in Trudering, Bavaria, on May 28, 2017, which is also known as her “beer tent speech.”
- 22 Cf. the speech by French President Emmanuel Macron at the Sorbonne, September 26, 2017.
- 23 Cf. Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, Volker Perthes, Strategic Autonomy of Europe: Actors, Fields of Action, Conflicting Goals, SWP Study, February 2019.
- 24 Cf. Douglas Lute, Nicholas Burns, NATO at Seventy, An Alliance in Crisis, Harvard Kennedy School, Report, February 2019.
- 25 For example, the Fraunhofer Institutes for Artificial Intelligence in Sankt-Augustin, which focus on AI, sensor data fusion, and space observation. There are also the German Aerospace Center (DLR), which conducts world-leading space research, and the Joint Air Power Competence Center (JAPCC) in Kalkar, which could make an important contribution to strengthening NATO’s competencies in the increasingly important area of space strategy.

APPENDIX



The Road to the Report

24 September	Constituent meeting of the Task Force, Bonn
24/25 September	Round table on the “Dialogue for Strategic Foresight and Transatlantic Relations”, Bonn
8 October	Expert hearing and discussion “America after the elections: Domestic Politics and the United States’ Global Role”, Berlin
28 October	Expert Hearing and discussion “Work, Research, Innovation, Technology: New Realities and New Ideas” (digital)
30 October	Expert hearing and discussion “Transatlantic Relations and Geostrategic Change: Constants, Changes and Options for Action” (digital)
12 November	Final Discussion by the Task Force (digital)
2 December	Publication and public debate of the report at the International Security Forum Bonn 2020



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
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Statements expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the opinion of each member of the Task Force.



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